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INTELLECTUAL INTEGRATION
James Boyd White*
In this paper, I want to talk about the activity of intellectual integra
tion itself: about what it can mean to integrate-to put together in a
complex whole-aspects of our culture, or of the world, that seem to us
disparate or unconnected; and what it can mean in so doing to inte
grate-to bring together in interactive life-aspects of our own minds
and beings that we normally separate or divide from each other: I want
to think of integration, that is-and of its opposite, disintegration-as
taking place on two planes of existence at once, the cultural and the indi
vidual. For what is at stake for us in the fragmentation of our culture is
the fragmentation of our own minds and lives; and the integrative
processes by which we resist this fragmentation on one plane of experi
ence, as we try to bring things together to make new wholes, are simulta
neously at work on the other as well.
To speak of "integration" may be a bit misleading, for to some this
term may imply an ideal of perfect unity or coherence, a reduction to a
dominant scheme in which every part has its proper and defined place.
But I mean to use the term rather differently, to include a tolerance for,
indeed a clarification of, diversity and difference. For me integration is at
its heart a kind of composition, and that in a literal sense: a putting
together of two things to make out of them a third, a new whole, with a
meaning of its own. In this process the elements combined do not lose
their identities but retain them, often in clarified form; yet each comes to
mean something different as well, when it is seen in relation to the other.
In this sense each element is transformed, as it becomes part of some
thing else, at a new level of complexity. At the same time we ourselves
* Hart Wright Professor of Law, Professor of English, Adjunct Professor of Classical Studies,
The University of Michigan. An earlier version of this paper was given as an address to the annual
meeting of the Association of Integrative Studies.
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are transformed as well, both as makers of the new object in the world
and as those who engage with it.
I shall begin to elucidate these somewhat Delphic remarks by talking about poetry, and about one short poem in particular; but by the end
I shall have reached far beyond it to what we normally think of as quite
different kinds of subjects, including law, the university, and the nature
of our minds.
I.
I start with poetry because it seems largely built on the principle I
have articulated, that we put two things together in such a way as to
make a third-different from the others yet respectful of them-with a
meaning of its own.
Think for example of the sounds of poetry. As Robert Frost said,
the poem, or at least the English poem, is in large measure built upon the
music that can be made by the tension between two different ways of
organizing sound: the sound of the meter and rhythm, in English most
naturally that of the iambic line, and the sound of the sentence as it
would be spoken in living speech. In the poem these two principles of
order begin and end together, but between those points they run in harmony and contrast to create a kind of music, almost as two melodic lines
might do. The effect is to create something new in the space between
mere musical prose on the one hand and mere singsong versification on
the other. Consider how this works in the following well-known and
very short poem by Robert Frost.
Dust of Snow
The way a crow
Shook down on me
The dust of snow
From a hemlock tree
Has given my heart
A change of mood
And saved some part
Of a day I had rued. 1
If you read this poem aloud you will feel the tension between the
force of its meter and rhyme, which works on the principle of recurring
forms and variations, and that of the long sentence of which it is made,
which has its own shape, turning after "mood" to surprise us with what
the meter has promised us, a momentary uplift.
These two principles of order provide different energies for continu1 R. FROST, Dust of Snow, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FRoST (E. Lathem ed. 1972). Copyright 1923, @1969 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., Copyright 1951 by Robert Frost. Reprinted
from THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST edited by Edward Connery Lathem, by permission of Henry
Holt and Company, Inc. and Jonathan Cape, Ltd.
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ation and cessation as well. Thus at one point in the poem the syntactic
sentence comes to an end-at "mood"-and we feel the necessity, or
probability, of stopping there; but we also know that we can't, for we are
only halfway through the rhyme scheme in the stanza, and this knowledge carries us forward two more lines. Or it works the other way: we
come to the end of the first stanza, which is a kind of closure; but the
sentence has not ended, and the force of our syntactical expectations carries us forward into the second. When the two systems close together at
the end, they do so with reinforced finality. They become one not
through merger, a loss of identity, but through interaction. Each is in
fact heard with new distinctness as it is poised against the other, the sentence sound against the meter and rhyme, the meter and rhyme against
the sentence sound. The reader holds both in his head at once.
To shift now from the sound of a poem to its images, think of what
this poem asks us to imagine. The black crow is given visual significance
by its juxtaposition with the white snow and the green hemlock (all the
colors unstated but necessary, known to us); but they have necessarily
symbolic significances too, for the crow and snow become images of
death, at least when they are combined with hemlock, which necessarily
reminds us of the poisonous root of which Socrates drank the liquor.
The images thus fall simultaneously into two planes of meaning, the natural and the symbolic. In this poem they do not merge, in part because
one kind of hemlock really is different from the other-you can make a
healthful hemlock tea from the tree in the poem-but remain in tension
to create something new in the space between them. There are two systems of meaning simultaneously at work here, the image of the walk in
the woods, with its minor catastrophe suddenly seen as a grace note, and
the far more foreboding system of symbolism-death and redemptionwhich hints at Grace of a different kind altogether. Part of the art of the
poem is keeping a distance between the two planes of meaning, so that
both are held in the mind at once, each playing against the other to make
a third.
The word "dust" from this point of view is lovely: it specifies the
visual image with great exactness, as we imagine the snow so dry and
crystalline that it bursts like shining dust in the air, while in the other
plane of meaning it reinforces the images of death, for we all know that
dust we are and unto dust we shall return.
With respect to the image-life of this poetry, then, just as with respect to its sounds, there are two principles of life and order, brought
together not to merge but to interact, to make a third thing out of the life
between them.
At least in representational poetry of the kind we see in Frost, there
is a similar opposition in another respect as well, for the poem creates a
tension between the sense that it represents an experience that is external
to it-the fall of snow-and the sense that it is itself a new experience, in
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language, with a meaning of its own. Just as the viewer of a painting sees
it now as a picture of the world, now as a composition in paint, the audience of the poem hears it now as an account of the world, now as a
composition in words.
And there is a similar doubleness in another dimension too, that of
time, for the poem can be seen as either taking place in time or as an
atemporal structure. That is, it can be thought of as it appears on the
page, as a structure that exists in two dimensions, spatially, to be described and explained by drawing connecting and contrasting arrows. Or
it can be seen as taking place in time, as read aloud say, with a beginning
and an ending, a moving from one place to another in a process of
change.
This sort of transformation across time is in fact essential to the life
of a poem. Think, for example, of the way the poem works on what
precedes it, turning Autumn, say, into Keats's poem "To Autumn," as
apples are turned into cider, or the dust of snow down the neck into "A
Dust of Snow," just as the dust of snow turned the day from one thing
into another. The poem converts what lies outside of it into its terms,
and does this not only with such ordinary-world experiences as these, but
with prior texts as well, such as those that give meaning to "hemlock"
and "dust." And the poem itself is self-transformative too, autopoetic,
making itself--or being made by the poet and the reader together-out
of its own origins, as a life is made, line by line. For from its first utterance it establishes expectations that the rest of it will confirm or upset or
modify, at each stage making new beginnings, giving rise to new expectations of its own. 2 It is only when we read the poem as taking place in
time that we can experience the "surprise" that Frost thought essential to
2 Think, for example, of Keats's great poem "To Autumn," which begins with hyperfruition:

Season of mists and mellow fruitfulness,
Close bosom friend of the maturing sun
and ends in crispness and clarity. The art of the poem, or much of it, lies in how we get from one
place to the other: the initial sense of excessive, distasteful fecundity, of deceit or conspiracy; the
long rallentando of the second stanza, which delays the change of things and delays it further, making us impatient and reducing the world to the "last oozings" of the cider press; and the great
pleasure afforded by the shift at the end to evening, to late autumn, and to sunset:
Hedge-crickets sing; and now with treble soft
The redbreast whistles from a garden croft;
And gathering swallows twitter in the skies.
J. KEATS, To Autumn, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN KEATS 273 (H.W. Garrod 2d ed. 1958).
Similarly here, in Frost's poem, there is a transformation of the original trite event, the irritating fall
of snow from the tree, into a moment laden with gentle ominousness, and then, by an act of poetic
grace, into an emblem of grace itself, for it "saves" what we have every reason to "rue," or repent.
In all of this the poem is made of the same stuff as human life, the life of its maker and its
audience: it takes place in time, it is autopoetic, made out of its own beginnings, and it converts
what is outside of itself into internally determined, though always tentative, forms. As a form, then,
the poem is in this respect about the way we grow and live, about the tprocesses of integration and
transformation it exemplifies.
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the poetic experience-here the surprise of discovering that the dust of
snow did not ruin the day but saved it, saved it from an earlier "ruing."
On the other hand, no one fully reads a poem the first time through
and our successive readings work to create a sense of the whole poem
existing outside of time and space, in an ideal realm. The re-readings
result in a kind of increasing appropriation of the verbal artifact to our
own consciousness. Ultimately the "temporal" sense we have of the
poem is not an accurate representation of any one actual reading, but a
constructed reading, an ideal reading taking place in ideal time as well as
ideal space, a world in which there is in fact no transformation, for the
whole poem exists simultaneously. The poem comes to have both existences at once in our minds, the temporal and transformative poised
against the atemporal and schematic, and much of its life is the play
between them.
To speak even more generally for a moment, in each of the dimensions I have mentioned-of sound, image, and time-there is a tension
between order and disorder: between the too regular, and thus singsong
and dead, and the wholly irregular or chaotic; between affirmation and
denial; between what can be said and what is unsayable; and in all of this
the poem puts together two things, two possibilities, in such a way as to
create a life between them.
All this means, among other things, that the poem cannot be reduced to paraphrase. It brings to life, and integrates, several dimensions
of speech at once: it places them in relation across space and time, and in
so doing creates something new of its own. It cannot be reduced to a
statement of this or that theory or message, to optimism or pessimism. It
is in fact a kind of speech with which "stating views" or "having a theory" or "delivering a message" is inconsistent; as a form, indeed, it is
critical of the assumptions on which such speech rests.
II.
What happens when we turn from the dense and concentrated form
of speech we call the poem to the forms of speech we ourselves employ,
especially in our academic and professional lives-when we look to the
texts, to the modes of discourse, we inhabit and create? What voices do
we hear, and find ourselves using? What kinds of conversations make up
our world? Are the texts we make and read integrative and transforming, as a poem is, and if not, could they be?
A.
Think for example of the piles of books and journal articles that
litter your office: With what expectations and what feelings do you turn
to them? If you are at all like me, you do so with a feeling of guilty dread
and with an expectation of frustration. We live in a world of specialized
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texts and discourses, which all too often seem marked by a kind of thinness, a want of life and force and meaning. How often, for example, do
you simply skim-read what is before you, and how often do you feel that
nothing is lost?
But what does it say about us, if this is true, if the literature we read
and write, the literature that defines our professional lives, can be skimread with so little loss? What kind of intellectual or other community is
defined by such voices, directed to such an audience? If you can skimread it, the text has a quality that is the opposite of poetic density, a kind
of extraordinary dilutedness.
Sometimes, of course, a voice arrests us, we slow down, perhaps we
move our chair and settle into a different position, or take something
home and think it through, paying a different kind of attention to it altogether. But how rare that is.
Do I exaggerate? Perhaps I do, but as a way of checking that, let me
ask you to suppose that you take a recent issue of the leading journal in
your field-or a general publication, say like the New York Review of
Books-and read it from cover to cover, then ask what minds, what discourse, what conversation, what intellectual community you could construct on the basis of that evidence, if it were all that you had. What
would these imagined speakers be like, as minds and as people? What
responses do they invite from you, what relationship do they seek to establish with you?
A wit once said of the highly oppositional and dramatic prose of
Macaulay that it is impossible to tell the truth in such a style. We can
borrow that remark and ask: What truths can be said in the styles and
voices and forms we ourselves professionally use? Certainly anyone who
has ever worked on a law journal must have wondered what could possibly be said in the form we call the "law review article," in the language
and voice of that genre-anything, that is, in which any person could
have any real interest. Of how many law review articles can one say,
here is a mind really speaking to other minds?
I pick on the law, with which I am perhaps most familiar, but I
think much the same could be said of professional discourse in other
fields. Part of the problem is what I have called thinness-so little life;
but part of it is too much life of a certain kind, an insistent assertiveness,
as if against something, against some other person who is denying what is
said. This is how things are, we are told; a deafening note of demand.
Yet am I insisting otherwise, or are you? Why then are we spoken to in
such a way? Too often the academic text that is written against the
views of others naturally seeks to meet every imagined objection in the
language in which it might be made, but in doing this it loses its control
over its own shape, its own language.
As I imagine the books and journals piled up in my office, then, I
want to ask: Where is writing that is about something that is actually
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important to the mind that composed it, regarded not as a professional
agent seeking a new relationship with a professional community, but as a
mind, trying to make sense of life and of the texts that make it up?
Where is the voice that compels attention by its authenticity, its urgency,
its presence, and invites a response from another? Or-to think of this
for the moment from the institutional or communal point of viewwhere is a conversation among a plurality of such voices? The university
should be the placeparexcellence for disinterested and passionate talk of
such a kind, but is it in fact? What kind of talk, among what kinds of
voices, defines your profession, your university, your larger culture?
So far I have been speaking as if the problem were out there, in texts
made by others, in them not us, in our reading not our writing, but of
course this is not true. The worst and most painful consequences of the
conditions of our discourse are those we suffer when we ourselves try to
write and find that we are captured by voices, audiences, and languages
that seem impossibly sterile or empty; diluted; defensive; full of static; in
a deep sense unreal. Think of one's own composing life: how often one
feels, as one listens to one's speech, that one is droning on and on, in a
tone of insistent demand, or that one's words are lilke broken chiclets in
the mouth, impeding one's talk to the point of inanity. Or how often one
turns in dismay the pages one has written, hearing in them the voice of
Anyprof and wondering whether it is ever possible to say anything well.
Our forms of speech, our very voices, seem to bleed what we have to say
of half its life.
Sometimes of course we have the experience of feeling that our language is adequate to our situation, that the forms of speech available to
us, or inventable by us, do what we want them to do, that we have voices
we can live with. Many of these occasions are small ones: an exchange
of familiar pleasantries on the sidewalk, when we get the tone just right;
the sense that a conversation in class has suddenly taken off with a new
life and in a new direction, a sense that may last only two or three minutes, and seldom lasts very much longer; or perhaps in writing a paper or
giving a talk, when we strike a sentence that seems to us fixed and right, a
sentence we can lean on. But this is not common anywhere in life and it
happens I think more often in ordinary conversation and classroom talk
than it does in our professional discourse.
Why should this be?
B.
I think many of the properties of professional discourse-perhaps all
of them-arise from our sense of the specialized audience we address,
and of ourselves with respect to that audience. In demonstrating our
qualifications to speak; in striking one tone rather than another; in the
definition of the question we address; and in the assemblage of materials
we bring to bear upon it; in all of this we seek to meet, or perhaps con-

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

found, our audience's expectations. Our articles and books are affirmations of the specialized discourse in which they are written, and beyond
that of the specialized community to which they are addressed. This is in
fact how fields or disciplines, which are really best thought of as communities of discourse, are constructed and maintained.
And of course this is not altogether a bad thing. In writing about
Thucydides, say, it is important to be able to write on the assumption
that your audience know Greek, and are familiar with the text, or that
they can find the references that you make; similarly, in writing about
law, it is important to be able to speak to those who can tolerate legal
citations or the use of a term of art like "jurisdiction." Knowledge can
advance only to the degree that it can be presumed in one's audience.
But while the existence of specialized audiences might explain the
existence of specialized discourses, it does not explain the deadness or
sterility of those discourses, nor does it tell us how to give them life.
I cannot wholly explain this phenomenon either, but I do think that
there is something about our conception of professionalism-perhaps it
has to do with the false use of science as a model of thought and discourse-that leads us to speak and write in ways that are false to the
character of our own intellectual lives. I believe, that is, that we actually
lead far richer and more complex lives, including professional lives, than
one who knew us only through our professional writing would ever
guess. We read more widely than our citations reflect; we think more
variously than our arguments suggest; we pursue questions in ways that
are more fully our own than we reveal; our relations with prior texts are
more rich and interesting than our bibliographic notes, in their often misleading claims to represent what we have read and thought about, are
likely to suggest. (Suppose our references were not to the literature we
think we are supposed to have read but to the texts we actually have
read, and thought about, and wish to respond to: How different would
our writing be, in voice and sense of audience, in shape and tone?) We
have intellectual lives of mystery and puzzle, excitement and meaning,
that are systematically bleached or obliterated by the formal styles of
professional discourse. Yet all too often we write in ways that confirm
and perpetuate that discourse, granting it authority over us and our
minds.
One result of our adherence to the forms, voices, styles of our respective professional communities is a kind of double segmentation, both
of the culture and of the individual mind. Separate communities of discourse are established, which seem to have nothing to say to one another,
or no way of saying it; in this sense the culture is divided. And since
none of us is wholly defined by his or her professional discourse-we are
all of us in this sense multi-lingual-there is a kind of corresponding
internal segmentation, a division of our own experience, of our minds.
Boundaries are thus drawn both among various professional or public
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forms of speech-horizontally, if you will-and vertically too, between
our professional speech and the ways we talk in the rest of life.
We must not stop writing to each other, and ought not stop writing
in ways that are more accessible to some audiences than to others. And
no one would recommend the purely personal voice, which would be as
empty in its way as the purely professional one is. But can we find ways
to talk that will reflect more fully what we know to be true of ourselves,
our minds, our language, and our cultures? Can we find voices that are
more fully our own, speaking to audiences more fully recognized as the
minds and people they actually are?
Or, to put it in the terms with which I began: What might it mean
to integrate, to put together in a complex whole, aspects of our culture,
or of the world, that seem to us disparate or unconnected, and in so
doing to integrate, to bring together in interactive life, aspects of our own
minds and beings that we normally separate or divide from each other?
What kind of lives could we make for ourselves, what kind of communities with others?
III.
To think of this in terms of our own lives and writing, we can ask:
How are we to engage in our own version of the activity of integration
and transformation that the poet exemplifies, the activity that our own
work so often impedes or denies? For many the first response is to think
in terms of our segmented intellectual culture, the split-up academic
world, and to try to address it through interdisciplinary work. This is
especially common for the lawyer, who turns to one discipline or another
in the hope that it will offer him what he feels his own to lack. But how
are we to do this? How are we to imagine, how talk about, what we are
trying to do?
A.
When we look to the languages that are normally used to describe
such activities we find that they are full of difficulty. Take, for example,
the common talk of "breaking down boundaries" or "establishing connections" between "fields"-as though there were entities out there in
the world, perhaps like the patchwork quilt of agricultural fields we see
beneath us as we fly over southern England, among which connectionsperhaps in the forms of wires, or pipes, or ditches-could be established.
But what is this territorial metaphor of the "field" or "boundary"? And
3
what can be meant by "connections"? It is all most unclear.
A somewhat more developed language for conceiving of, and talking
3 Perhaps the "field" is to be thought of as a force field, like those created by a magnet that
forces a chaotic assembly of iron filings into an array between its poles. This image does catch some
of the aggressiveness of modem academic life and its division of the world into those who act and
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about, cross-disciplinary work is that of "findings." The idea is that the
"findings" of one field should be made available to others, as though history or economics or philosophy, say, should pass a plate with the truth
on it over to the law, which would then in some unspecified way put it to
use. But this is of course far more difficult than such locutions suggest.
In the first place, the image of the world created by one of these disciplines is not monolithic but full of variety and tension, not so much a set
of established propositions as a set of questions and methods. The results
of such work are normally not "findings" in any simple sense of the word
but tentative conclusions in a series of tentative conclusions, elaborated
topics for argument and discussion of a certain kind. A discipline can for
many purposes in fact be defined as a community of discourse organized
around its disagreements, its ways of disagreeing, as well as its agreements. And even where a field does establish a particular view of the
world, it does so only from its own point of view-its purposes and aims,
its prior questions, and senses of method-and this makes the simple
translation of findings impossible.
Consider, for example, the attempt of the law to rely upon the "findings" of psychiatrists as to the "sanity" of criminal defendants. While it
is not true that the psychiatrists have nothing useful to say to the lawnot at all-it is true that their "findings" are not very usable by the law,
for the reason that the two systems of discourse, and the two communities, operate on such radically opposed premises. Psychiatry thinks in
terms of treatment and diagnosis and health; the law thinks in terms of
guilt, blame, and punishment. There is a radical incompatibility between
the discourses, between the conceptions of the human subject and the
speaker's relation to him or her, that makes any transfer of "findings"
problematic, to say the least, and renders the conversations in which that
is attempted-recorded for us in courtroom transcripts-confused in
ways that are at once highly comic and deeply tragic. 4 Or suppose it
were established to the satisfaction of the psychological community that
one group of human beings, defined by certain inheritable characteristics,
scored less well on certain tests of mental facility than did another such
group. The psychologists could, I suppose, tell us very little about the
value of the particular set of mental facilities that they tested for and
nothing at all about the social consequences that might properly be
thought to flow from this fact.
These are of course rather extreme examples but I think they establish a truth that applies in other cases as well, even at the other end of the
spectrum. Think for example of the use of expert economic testimony,
say on market share or the effects of a particular administrative decision,
where the law explicitly invokes economic criteria. Even there, as every
those who are acted upon. But what relations could exist between such "fields," other than domi-

nance, subjection, or indifference?
4 See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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practicing lawyer knows, the law does not, and cannot, simply sit back
and let the experts tell us their "findings": the lawyer who participates in
such a case must train herself in the presuppositions of the discipline, the
hypotheses upon which the whole edifice rests, the kinds of tentativeness
necessarily built into the conclusions, and so on. To prepare a witness of
her own or to cross-examine the witness of another, the lawyer must in
fact become something of an expert herself, in arguing to judge, jury, or
hearing examiner, and she must be prepared to educate her audience into
expertise as well. As lawyers we cannot simply accept the conclusions of
others; we must make them our own, and to do that we must move out of
the legal culture and into the other one. In doing this we are not picking
up "findings," but learning a language.
Still more advanced than the language of "findings" is that of "intellectual method." The idea here is that one learns from another discipline
not its "findings," but its methodology, which can be brought like a
machine to problems in one's own field, upon which it will go to work
without itself undergoing any transformation. Thinking again of the law,
this is the way that some people talk about the use of literary or critical
theory, or philosophical hermeneutics; as though one simply learned an
interpretive or critical technique or methodology and then turned to the
law and put it to work. But the concerns of the literary critic are quite
different from those of the lawyer and any meaningful comparisons must
take place by a process of translation that is based upon rather full
knowledge of the practices that define each community-and at the level
of particularity and not merely at the level of theory or technique. Similarly, a certain branch of economics has been proposed to the law as the
machine that will solve all its problems, this time with the power relations reversed: instead of the methodology being subordinated to the
preexisting concerns of the lawyer, the claim is made that the method of
economics can simply supplant law. But in either case the idea is of a
discipline as a technology: you learn to run the machine of literary or
economic analysis, then you wheel it up to the new object, called the law,
and it goes to work, spitting out results as a log chipper spits out wood
chips.
These are at bottom images of interdisciplinary work either as territorial spread or conquest, in which one "field"-or its inhabitants-simply absorbs or takes over another, or as a kind of mechanics. All of them
assume that when you put two things together only one is in any meaningful way changed.
B.
This kind of talk is rooted, I think, in our false contemporary metalanguages about knowing, learning, and talking. Take, for example, our
standard language of "communication": the idea is that I have in my
head some idea or perception or fact which I wish to get across to you; if
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I am successful, you will end up at the end of the process with exactly
what I had in my mind, or at least a reasonable facsimile thereof. This is
a model not only of expression, but of knowledge, and the acquisition of
knowledge, and the institutionalization of knowledge too. I acquire bits
of knowledge from experience and from others, which I then sort into
various categories, where they are then available for communication to
others. It is the organization of such bits of knowledge that makes up
what we call a "field"; and the university is nothing but an assemblage of
such fields.
This is not only false to our experience of language and learning and
talking, it creates an incoherent image of our collective intellectual life.
If the university is to have a character of its own as a social and intellectual world, there must be some way of organizing these fields into a
whole. But what could it be? This is the point at which we find it natural to speak about "connections," "bridges," the transmission of "findings" from one field to another, and the application of the "technology"
of one discipline to the problems of another. It is all a bureaucratic,
objectifying, and nominalizing vision of the world, operating on a cluster
of related metaphors which ultimately imagine organization in terms of
territories or machines and which are wholly inadequate to real intellectual lives and communities.
What is most obviously missing from this mechanistic picture of the
world is the individual human mind. In this image of life, people are
inquirers and processors of knowledge, which they organize into structures. But how is this done? What is the life of the inquiring and investigating mind? What would happen if we began to think of what we do as
if each of us were an independent mind, defining and pursuing questions
of its own, motivated by interest and curiosity, by a sense of importance
or urgency? This is to suggest that we think experientially, or phenomenologically, about human beings as human beings rather than as parts of
machines. This leads us to a different conception of the intellectual community and of the conversational process by which it is maintained. For
none of us acts alone: our minds, our questions, our sense of what needs
to be said, of what can be said, are all shaped by interaction with others;
and our aims are not statable in terms of attainable "goals," but in the
kind of inquiring and conversing life we hope to make possible for ourselves and for others.
Suppose, then, we were to think of our minds as minds, and our
selves as engaged with the perpetual questions: How to think? What to
think? What to say and how to say it? What are "fields" to such a mind,
and how real are the "boundaries" between them? How are we to talk
about, how imagine, what we are doing when we talk to each other
across these lines? If you think of fields not as terrains or machines, but
as communities of discourse, groups of people defined by their willingness to talk in certain ways, the question becomes: What kind of rela-
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tionships can we establish among these various ways of talking, and the
communities they define? In so doing, what larger community can we
create?
IV.
As a way of thinking about the possibilities suggested by that question I would like now to turn to the relations between two "fields" I
know something about, law and literature. I want to put aside both the
"findings" conception of interdisciplinary work-which here mainly consists of using literature to establish truths about the inhumanity of lawand the "technology" conception-which here mainly consists of using
the terminology developed in the current critical theory debates to carry
on preexisting arguments about the way legal texts should be interpreted.
Instead I want to ask how they might be put together in such a way as to
change both and make a third.
In doing this I shall speak about what I have attempted to do in my
own work, as a way of representing one mind's efforts to put things together in a certain way.
When I went to law school from doing graduate work in English
Literature, I was startled to discover how similar the two enterprises
were, and similar in ways that seemed to be generally unremarked. I had
expected to be at an enormous disadvantage compared with people who
had studied political science or economics, but I discovered that I was
not, for the habits of close reading and textual analysis that I had developed as a reader of literature were in fact very close to those required by
legal training. This circumstance, I think, led me to think about the law
as a kind of literature and my first book, The Legal Imagination, was
aimed at working that idea out. My initial question was: What happens
if we look at the literature of the law as if it really were literature, as
though it defined speakers and a world, a set of possibilities for expression and community? Edmund Wilson in a famous essay gave a reading
of Emily Post's Etiquette as though it were a novel: What happens if you
read the law as if it is a novel? The context in which I asked this question
was a course for law students, and there it is easy to make the answer
seem disastrous: the law can be made to seem a dead, bureaucratic, overconceptualized, unfeeling language if any is, and the question can be
brought home to the future lawyer with some vividness: What does it
mean to devote your life to speaking such a language, in such forms, and
with such voices?
The point of my comparison of law with literature, despite what I
have just said, is actually not to maintain that literature is superior to law
but to help the reader see that law can be regarded as a literary activity,
and that so regarded it affords the composing mind, and the community
more generally, a range of opportunities that ordinary life lacks. Looked
at as a piece of interdisciplinary work, then, the aim of this book is not to
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"connect fields" but to transform our sense of law by putting it together
with something else: to see it as a compositional process, as a set of
activities by which minds use language to make meaning and establish
relations to others. This is to suggest the possibility of integration at the
individual level too, for from this point of view an essential part of the
task of the lawyer, and of the judge, can be said to be the establishment of
a voice of his or her own in the law, a way of speaking that is both
professionally excellent and individually authentic-indeed I think it
cannot be the former unless it is the latter.
But how about literature? Is our sense of it transformed too when
we put it together with the law? This is a question that motivated my
next work, When Words Lose Their Meaning. Here the idea was to reverse the flow of The Legal Imagination, and to read "literature" as if in
some sense it were law. This, it turned out, involved directing attention
to three places in the text. The first step is to identify in works of literature, history, and philosophy the set of resources of speech and thought,
the cultural inheritance, that is analogous to what we call the law: to
that body of cases, statutes, and other precedents that define a lawyer's
situation by offering him certain occasions upon which, and certain
materials with which, to speak (and by denying him others). In a sense,
that is, we are all like lawyers, for we all act out of a particular linguistic
inheritance and in a particular rhetorical situation, both of which can be
subject to critical analysis and judgment. The first questions that "reading as a lawyer" leads me to ask of another text, then, are: What is the
cultural and linguistic inheritance out of which the writer functions?
What is the social circumstance, the rhetorical position, out of which he
speaks? These obviously lead to other questions as well: How can this
inheritance and these circumstances best be described, and how, if at all,
can they be judged? In what respects, for example, are they constraining
or enabling? This starts us off on a process of cultural criticism.
But none of us simply replicates the materials of our culture in our
speech or in our conduct, we act upon and modify our languages all the
time. The lawyer again represents, in somewhat exaggerated form, a universal human condition, for while she uses her materials she is always
arguing for their reformation. In general terms what this means is that
we can ask not only what a speaker's inheritance is, but how, by what
art, and to what end, she modifies it. This is a form of aesthetic criticism.
The third focus of attention suggested by "reading as a lawyer" is
the set of relations we enact in our speech, relations both with our audience and with those other people we talk about. This is again a feature of
speech that is exaggeratedly clear for lawyers, who are required to address each other, and judges, in certain highly stylized ways, and clear
too for the law more generally, which establishes fundamental relations
among actors in our polity. But something like it is true whenever one
person speaks to another. We all know what it is like to be patronized,
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flattered, manipulated, or, on the other hand, spoken to directly and honestly, in a way that recognizes our autonomy and freedom, and we know
that the relations we create in our talking can be analyzed and judged.
This is a form of ethical and political criticism.
I see the lawyer, then, as engaged in a set of linguistic and literary
activities, just as the poet or novelist is, just as the priest, the politician,
and ordinary citizen are. Likewise, I see the poet or novelist, the politician, priest, and ordinary citizen, as engaged in certain forms of political
and ethical discourse-of "legal" discourse-just as the lawyer is, and on
all sides whether they know it or not. The aim of the comparison is to
see each in a new way by placing it next to the other, and in so doing to
make something new that comprises both. The relation between law and
literature is not the transfer of "findings" from field to field, nor the
transportation of "method," thought of as a kind of intellectual machine
that can go to work on new subjects without itself being modified, but a
bringing to consciousness of the nature of our own intellectual and linguistic practices, both literary and legal, with the hope of holding them
in the mind at once in such a way as to change our sense of both.
The kind of comparison I mean need not be made with literature,
and need not be as general as this. To think of it in curricular terms, for
example, and to continue to think of the law, I could imagine a course
not in law and history, or sociology or economics or anthropology, but
law as each of those things. Our initial question would be: How is this
writer of a legal text functioning, whether he knows it or not, as an historian, sociologist, anthropologist? And of course the direction could be
reversed, and we could ask: How is this anthropologist or historian, say,
functioning as a lawyer? In both cases the hope would be to bring together in the mind at once two systems of discourse, two sets of questions
and methods and motives, with the aim of making new texts that would
incorporate both, not to merge them into one but to recognize their differences as we sought their similarities. We would hope, for example, to
reflect in what we say the ways in which the lawyer is a practical and
moral actor in the world, whose speech is a speech of power; and the
ways in which, on the other hand, his lack of power of this kind creates a
difficulty and an opportunity for every poet, every critic. We would put
ourselves in the position of translators, those who know that what is said
in one language cannot simply be set over into another without loss or
gain and who therefore conceive of their task as the creation of new compositions that will establish mutually respectful relations between them.
As we made such attempts, we should gradually find ourselves more
fully able to reflect in our own speech what we know as individual minds
to be true of ourselves, our minds, our languages, and our audiences.
The process of integration, that is, should take place both at the cultural
level, where two discourses are placed together to make a third way of
talking, and at the level of the individual mind, as we put together parts
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of ourselves that we normally separate to make new voices for ourselves-and, as we talk together, new communities of discourse.
To do this we need to find ways to hold in our minds at once different vocabularies, styles, and tones--different discourse systems-not to
merge them but to integrate them, that is, to place them in balance with
each other, in order to make, in our talk and our teaching and in our
writing, texts that have some of the life of poetry.
*

*:

*

*

*

I have been speaking largely out of a sense of dissatisfaction: dissatisfaction with the languages I see available for my use, and with my own
relation to them, with the forms of discourse I find myself using, with the
conversations I engage in and observe, with the voices I hear myself and
others using, with the texts and communities we make. This dissatisfaction is especially acute with specialized professional discourses, especially
in the academic world, but it is not confined to those. More generally it
is with a bureaucratized culture, one that reduces human actors to very
narrow roles, human speakers to very thin speech. For me the best response is what I have called integration and transformation, the attempt
to put together parts of our culture, and corresponding parts of ourselves, in ways that will make new languages, voices, and forms of discourse possible. Part of this can take the form of "interdisciplinary
work," but only of a certain kind; and the crossing of disciplinary boundaries is not essential to what I am talking about.
What in my view is essential is that we should insist upon seeing the
world as made up of people talking to each other. For me the fundamental image of life is not that of economic production and exchange, nor
that of knowledge acquisition and transfer, but that of composition: people seeking to make texts that will establish meanings and relations with
others. We should conceive of the relevant world as a world of people
speaking to each other across their discourses, out of their languages, out
of their communities of knowledge and expertise, and speaking as people
seeking to be whole. We should try to write that way ourselves.
The direction of thought I recommend is thus in large part introspective: we should direct our attention towards the practices we all engage in all the time, with the object of making them more self-conscious,
and therefore amenable to more complete understanding and modification. The object of this kind of work can be defined partly in terms of
voice: Can we find a wider range of voices, of ways of being, in our
writing and offer a wider range to others? Can we be, for example, less
assertive, or less continually assertive, more open and tentative and suggestive in our style? Can we find voices of our own that will reflect more
fully what we know to be true of ourselves, our minds, our languages,
and our cultures?
The object can also be defined in terms of the text itself, of the text
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we make, and here I return to the conception of poetic integration with
which I began: Can we learn to produce texts that are more "integrated"
in the sense that in them we put two things-two systems of discourse,
two sets of practices-together in such a way as to make a third that
transforms our sense of both? Can we become more fully conscious of
what we, and our languages, leave out, and find ways to reflect that consciousness in our speech? Can we find ways to connect the way we talk
professionally with the ways we talk in ordinary life? The object is not
the connection of fields but integration: the integration of parts of our
culture, and parts of ourselves, into new wholes.
Of course these new wholes would not be units or integers but compositions, and the kind of integration of self and culture that is possible
for us is not permanent but temporary: it must be achieved over and
over again as we assemble fragments into new orders, each of which has
within it the principles of tension and disorder. The clarification of life
achieved by a poem, as Frost reminds us, is not permanent and absolute
but temporary and incomplete: a "momentary stay against confusion."
What would happen if we took this as a prescription for our own
work?
One consequence is that others would find what we wrote difficult to
read. They would find it hard to understand what we wrote as history,
or as law, or as literary theory; they would find that what we said did not
fall neatly into focus given their present lenses, that parts were too near
and parts were too far away; they would want to reduce or translate what
we produced into other terms, to locate it in contexts not of our making,
which they would feel would explain it. But if we wrote well our insights
would not be portable, nor our texts readily outlined or skim-read.
When people asked us to be explicit in saying what we "mean," we
would have to prepare ourselves, and them, for disappointment, since the
language of explicit statement denies many of the ways we hope our texts
will have meaning. We would hope to speak in ways that could not readily be translated into the propositional and assertive forms that are second nature to the academic world; for instead of integrating diversity,
such forms collapse the possibilities of speech to a single rather monotonous plane, in which it is indeed hard to tell the truth.
What is more, since each of us would be engaged in independent and
introspective work, we would be perpetually rediscovering, or reinventing, many of the most basic truths of human life. Others would say that
we were wasting our time, "reinventing the wheel." But this would be a
merit, not a fault, for the most fundamental truths about human nature
and life must be discovered afresh by each of us, and discovered over and
over again, because it is our nature to dilute and forget them.
We would speak out of a consciousness of our language and its limits, of our social circumstances and its limits, with the object of bringing
our fragmented culture together in coherent ways in our own minds, and
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in doing so, of bringing parts of ourselves together in coherent ways. The
hope would be to establish a world of people speaking to each other as
whole minds.
The center of attention would always be on the individual as a writing or composing mind, putting into shape and order his or her responses. We could not be a Movement, for the language of movements,
necessarily simplifying, reductive, and technological, is inconsistent with
all of this. We would have to accept our situation as individuals, speaking to individuals, out of our situations, with as much truth and urgency
as we could manage, and be ready to accept responsibility for the integrity and coherence of our compositions and of our voices.
To think of this in terms of our teaching, our focus would be upon
intellectual life as practice and activity; upon the nature of whole-minded
engagement and whole-minded speech, as we found it in texts we read
and as we struggled to attain it ourselves. We would hope above all that
our students would take satisfaction in assuming responsibility for what
they say and what they become, in an enactment of the kind of maturity
that is essential to democracy.
Our speech would be poetic not in the usual sense, for we would not
write verse, but in another sense, for we would always be trying to put
two things together in such a way as to make a third; and in the process
we would change ourselves, and offer change to others, making poems of
our own in our classrooms, in our curriculum, in our conversations with
each other.

